Differential focus in causal and counterfactual thinking – Different possibilities or different functions?

Les différences entre la pensée causale et la pensée contrefactuelle – Différentes possibilités ou différentes fonctions?

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Authors
  1. Mandel, D.R.
Corporate Authors
Defence R&D Canada - Toronto, Toronto ONT (CAN)
Abstract
In The Rational Imagination, Byrne proposes a mental models account of why causal and counterfactual thinking often focus on different antecedents. This review critically examines the two central propositions of her account, finding both only weakly defensible. Byrne’s account is contrasted with Judgment Dissociation Theory, which offers a functional explanation for differences in the focus of causal and counterfactual thinking.

Il y a un résumé en français ici.

Keywords
Counterfactual thinking;causal thinking;cause;enabling condition;mental models theory;judgment dissociation theory
Report Number
DRDC-TORONTO-SL-2007-113 — Scientific Literature
Date of publication
01 Sep 2007
Number of Pages
4
DSTKIM No
CA032076
CANDIS No
531118
Format(s):
Electronic Document(PDF)

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