Meta-Analysis of Hurricane Katrina – Lessons Learned

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Authors
  1. Hales, D.
  2. Miller, J.
Corporate Authors
Defence R&D Canada - Centre for Security Science, Ottawa ONT (CAN)
Abstract
This work provides analysis of the meta-organizational factors that contributed to the catastrophic results of Hurricane Katrina in New Orleans in August 2005. Organizational, cultural, sociological and technical issues were examined, and interactions between them, to underline the conditions that allowed New Orleans to be so significantly flooded. Research began with White House documents, and quickly branched out into varied collateral sources including the US Senate, the US Army Corps of Engineers, the Government Accountability Office, State and Local government documents and interviews with officials, the Public Broadcasting Service, and academia. The research was performed in support of a Defence Research and Development Canada (DRDC) Technology Investment Fund (TIF) supported by the Centre for Security Science (CSS). The research sought to identify capability gaps, organizational and institutional limitations that allowed Katrina to manifest catastrophe on the scale observed, and to draw comparisons to the Canadian context where applicable. Identified gaps were mapped to the Defence S&T Strategy to identify where lessons are applicable in the Canadian all-hazards Emergency Response context.

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Keywords
Hurricane Katrina;Emergency Planning;Emergency Response;Lessons Learned;Prevention;Resilience;Recovery
Report Number
DRDC-CSS-CR-2008-07 — Contractor Report
Date of publication
01 Mar 2008
Number of Pages
102
DSTKIM No
CA032304
CANDIS No
531485
Format(s):
Electronic Document(PDF)

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