SOVIET MILITARY DOCTRINE AND STRATEGY: THE EVOLUTION OF NUCLEAR DOCTRINE (LA DOCTRINE ET STRATEGIE MILITAIRE SOVIETIQUE: L'EVOLUTION DE LA DOCTRINE NUCLEAIRE)

Authors
  1. Kamoff-Nicolsky, G.
Corporate Authors
Operational Research and Analysis Establishment, Ottawa ONT (CAN) Directorate of Mathematics and Statistics
Abstract
The study, based solely on Soviet source material, traces the evolution of Soviet nuclear doctrine from the initial decision to incorporate nuclear weapons into the Soviet arsenal to its present status. Initially equated simply to increased firepower, nuclear weapons, with the development of missile delivery systems, became the preeminent element of the Soviet armed forces. Over the past decade, however, issues relating to the useability of such weaponry have brought about doctrinal change. Nuclear war is no longer an extension of political action and is not winnable. Soviet action is being directed, therefore, at eliminating INF and tactical nuclear weapons as a precaution against escalation. Intercontinental systems are to be reduced. But, sufficient nuclear weapons are to be retained as a deterrent and a means of ensuring Soviet long range military power projection until high technology conventional weaponry is available to provide the USSR with such a capability.
Report Number
ORAE-EXTRA-MURAL-PAPER-46 — Extra-Mural Paper
Date of publication
15 Mar 1988
Number of Pages
127
DSTKIM No
88-02652
CANDIS No
55875
Format(s):
Hardcopy;Originator's fiche received by DSIS

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