The Russian Federation Navy Post-2015 – Implications for Western Navies*


  1. Rudd, D.
Corporate Authors
Defence Research and Development Canada, Centre for Operational Research and Analysis, Ottawa ON (CAN)
In the wake of the crisis in Ukraine and the general deterioration of relations between Russia and NATO, Western strategists and policy-makers must consider how to deal with what appears to be a revanchist and opportunistic Russia. The seizure of Crimea, a poorly-concealed intervention in eastern Ukraine, and statements that Moscow would intervene on behalf of Russian-speaking populations outside Russia proper, are challenging the notion held in much of the West that great power confrontation in the Euro-Atlantic space is a thing of the past. While it may be premature to characterize naval capability development in Russia as a build-up, eff orts to arrest and reverse the post-Cold War atrophy of the Russian Federation Navy (RFN) are underway. In what might be more accurately termed a slow rebirth, the RFN has been the recipient of greater attention from the Kremlin in terms of policy direction and investment since the early 2000s. The navy’s short-term force development priorities are discernible, as is its overall strategic purpose. The Royal Canadian Navy (RCN) and allied counterparts should take these matters into account as they contemplate their own future.
Royal Canadian Navy;Russia;sea control;naval expansion;cruise missiles;submarines;surface combatants
Report Number
DRDC-RDDC-2015-P031 — External Literature
Date of publication
01 Jul 2015
Number of Pages
Electronic Document(PDF)

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