Institutional Analysis and Irregular Warfare – A case study of the French Army in Algeria 1954-1960

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Authors
  1. Ouellet, E.
  2. Pahlavi, P.C.
Corporate Authors
Defence R&D Canada - Centre for Security Science, Ottawa ONT (CAN);Canadian Forces College, Toronto ON (CAN)
Abstract
This paper proposes a case study to illustrate the usefulness of sociological institutional analysis as a method to uncover “blue force” challenges to deal with irregular warfare. The French Army’s adaptation to revolutionary warfare in Algeria, starting in 1954, is used to illustrate both the application of the methodology and how institutional forces can hinder as well as overwhelm transformation for irregular warfare. The analysis emphasizes three key dimensions of the French Army’s institutional adaptation: the regulative, normative and cognitive. These empirical elements are used to show how they interacted and influenced the institutional implementation of the French COIN structures.

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Keywords
Organizations;whole of government;comprehensive approach;institutional analysis,;decision making;collaboration;Counter-Insurgency Operations;COIN;Algerian War;Military
Report Number
DRDC-CSS-CR-2012-020 — Contractor Report
Date of publication
01 Dec 2012
Number of Pages
30
DSTKIM No
CA037019
CANDIS No
536665
Format(s):
Electronic Document(PDF)

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