Institutional Analysis and Irregular Warfare – A case study of the French Army in Algeria 1954-1960
- Authors
- Corporate Authors
- Defence R&D Canada - Centre for Security Science, Ottawa ONT (CAN);Canadian Forces College, Toronto ON (CAN)
- Abstract
- This paper proposes a case study to illustrate the usefulness of sociological institutional analysis as a method to uncover “blue force” challenges to deal with irregular warfare. The French Army’s adaptation to revolutionary warfare in Algeria, starting in 1954, is used to illustrate both the application of the methodology and how institutional forces can hinder as well as overwhelm transformation for irregular warfare. The analysis emphasizes three key dimensions of the French Army’s institutional adaptation: the regulative, normative and cognitive. These empirical elements are used to show how they interacted and influenced the institutional implementation of the French COIN structures.
- Keywords
- Organizations;whole of government;comprehensive approach;institutional analysis,;decision making;collaboration;Counter-Insurgency Operations;COIN;Algerian War;Military
- Report Number
- DRDC-CSS-CR-2012-020 — Contractor Report
- Date of publication
- 01 Dec 2012
- Number of Pages
- 30
- DSTKIM No
- CA037019
- CANDIS No
- 536665
- Format(s):
- Electronic Document(PDF)
Document 1 of 1
- Date modified: